Tag Archives: technology

Features You’d Normally Never Hear About – 2017 Reboot.

We’ve been ‘saving the world’ for, hmmm, now let me see, a good 19 years already! Actually it’s several years longer than that, but 19 years ago was when we registered KL as a (UK) company.

Alas, ‘saving the world’ once and for all and forever just ain’t possible: cyberthreats are evolving all the time, with the cyber-miscreants behind them forever finding new attack vendors across the digital landscape, meaning that landscape will never be 100% safe. However, hundreds of millions of folks all around the world, on different devices and in different life situations, each day have the possibility to protect their privacy and data, safely use online stores and banking, and protect their kids from digital filth, cyber-perverts and con-artists.

ginger-girl

And on our side – the ones doing the protecting – there’s plenty of raison d’être for our experts: each photo rescued from ransomware, every blocked phishing site, each shut down botnet, and every cyber-bandit sentenced to prison: each one = cause for professional satisfaction and pride. It means all the hard work wasn’t for nothing; we really are doing good.

In the struggle against cyber-filth, cyber-perverts and cyber-crooks, we’ve got for you a range continually improved tools.

Read on: Sharper than a Valerian steel sword…

Laziness, Cybersecurity, and Machine Learning.

It’s just the way it is: the human being is a lazy creature. If it’s possible not to do something, we don’t do it. However, paradoxically this is a good thing, because laziness is… the engine of progress! What? How so? Well, if a job’s considered too hard or long-winded or complex for humans to do, certain lazy (but conscientious) humans (Homo Laziens?: ) give the job to a machine! In cybersecurity we call it optimization.

Analysis of millions of malicious files and websites every day, developing ‘inoculations’ against future threats, forever improving proactive protection, and solving dozens of other critical tasks – all of that is simply impossible without the use of automation. And machine learning is one of the main concepts used in automation.

Machine learning has been applied in cybersecurity for more than a decade – only without marketing fanfare.

Automation has existed in cybersecurity right from the beginning (of cybersecurity itself). I remember, for example, how back in the early 2000s I wrote the code for a robot to analyze incoming malware samples: the robot put the detected files into the corresponding folder of our growing malware collection based on its (the robot’s) verdict regarding its (the file’s!) characteristics. It was hard to imagine – even back then – that I used to do all that manually!

These days however, simply giving robots precise instructions for tasks you want them to do isn’t enough. Instead, instructions for tasks need to be given imprecisely. Yes, really!

For example, ‘Find the human faces on this photograph’. For this you don’t describe how human faces are picked out and how human faces differ from those of dogs. Instead what you do is show the robot several photographs and add: ‘These things here are humans, this is a human face, and these here are dogs; now work the rest out yourself’! And that, in a nutshell, is the ‘freedom of creativity’ that calls itself machine learning.

SourceImage source

Read on: ML + CS = Love…

The Artificial ‘Artificial Intelligence’ Bubble and the Future of Cybersecurity.

I think the recent article in the New York Times about the boom in ‘artificial intelligence’ in Silicon Valley made many people think hard about the future of cybersecurity – both the near and distant future.

I reckon questions like these will have been pondered on:

  • Where’s the maniacal preoccupation with ‘AI’, which now only exists in the fantasies of futurologists going to lead to?
  • How many more billions will investors put into ventures which, at best, will ‘invent’ what was invented decades ago, at worst – will turn out to be nothing more than inflated marketing… dummies?
  • What are the real opportunities for the development of machine learning cybersecurity technologies?
  • And what will be the role of humans experts in this brave new world?

Sometimes when I hang around with A.I. enthusiasts here in the valley, I feel like an atheist at a convention of evangelicals.

Jerry Kaplan, computer scientist, author, futurist and serial entrepreneur (inc. co-founder of Symantec)

What’s going on now in the field of ‘AI’ resembles a soap bubble. And we all know what happens to soap bubbles eventually if they keep getting blown up by the circus clowns (no pun intended!): they burst.

Now, of course, without bold steps and risky investments a fantastical future will never become a reality. But the problem today is that along with this wave of widespread enthusiasm for ‘AI’ (remember, AI today doesn’t exist; thus the inverted commas), startup-shell-companies have started to appear.

A few start-ups? What’s the big deal, you might ask.

The big deal is that these shell-startups are attracting not millions but billions of dollars in investment – by riding the new wave of euphoria surrounding ‘AI’ machine learning. Thing is, machine learning has been around for decades: it was first defined in 1959, got going in the 70s, flourished in the 90s, and is still flourishing! Fast forward to today and this ‘new’ technology is re-termed ‘artificial intelligence’; it adopts an aura of cutting-edge science; it gets to have the glossiest brochures; it gets to have the most glamorously sophisticated marketing campaigns. And all of that is aimed at the ever-present human weakness for belief in miracles – and in conspiracy theories about so-called ‘traditional’ technologies. And sadly, the cybersecurity field hasn’t escaped this new ‘AI’ bubble…

artificial-intelligence

Read on: Too much AI will kill you…

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Darwinism in IT Security, Pt. 3: Time to Deal with These No-Good Parasites.

Hi all!

On a bit of a roll here on the survival-of-the-fittest-in-IT theme. Wasn’t planning a trilogy… it just kinda happened. Sort of…

…Sort of, as, well, the specific problem of parasites in the IT Security world I’ll be writing about today has been at the back of my mind for a long time already. This Darwinism talk seemed the perfect opportunity to finally let rip. You’ll see what I mean…

Today folks: parasites. But not those we’re fighting against (the ‘very’ bad guys); those who claim are also fighting the very bad guys (philosophical question: who’s worse?).

Infosec parasites practicing detection adoption is killing the industry and indirectly assisting cybercrime

The IT industry today is developing at a galloping pace. Just 10-15 years ago its main themes were desktop antiviruses, firewalls and backups; today there’s a mass of new different security solutions, approaches and ideas. Sometimes we manage to stay ahead of the curve; sometimes we have some catch-up to do. And there are other times we fall into a stupor from astonishment – not from new technologies, innovations or fresh ideas, but from the barefaced brazenness and utter unscrupulousness of our colleagues in the security industry.

But first, let me explain how events have been developing.

There’s a very useful service called the VirusTotal multiscanner. It aggregates around 60 antivirus engines, which it uses to scan files and URLs folks send it for malware checking, and then it returns the verdict.

Example: Joe Bloggs finds a suspicious application or office document on a hard drive/USB stick/the Internet. Joe’s own antivirus software doesn’t flag it as containing a malware, but Joe is the paranoid type; he wants to make really sure it’s not infected. So he heads over to the VirusTotal site, which doesn’t have just one antivirus solution like he does, but ~60. It’s free too, so it’s a no brainer. So Joe uploads the file to VirusTotal and gets instant info on what all the different AVs think about it.

First of all, to clarify: both the folks at VirusTotal and those at VirusTotal’s owners Google are firmly on the ‘good guys’ side. They have no connection with parasites whatsoever. VirusTotal is run by a very professional team, which has for years been fulfilling the task at hand extremely effectively. (Still need convincing? How about VirusTotal winning the MVP award last year at the Security Analyst Summit (SAS)?) Today VirusTotal is one of the most important sources of new malware samples and malicious URLs; and also a very cool archeological tool for researching targeted attacks.

The problem lies with a handful of shady users of the multiscanner who, alas, are becoming more and more unblushingly unabashed in how they conduct themselves.

Read on: Things getting interesting… for wrong reasons

Darwinism in IT Security – Pt. 2: Inoculation from BS.

Hi folks!

As promised, herewith, more on the connection between evolution theory and how protection against cyberthreats develops.

To date, what precisely brings about mutations of living organisms is unknown. Some of the more unconventional experts reckon it’s the work of viruses, which intentionally rearrange genes (yep, there’s who really rules the world!). But whatever the case may be, similar mutation processes also occur in IT Security – sometimes with the help of viruses too.

The market is tired of prophets; these days monetizing ‘panaceas’ requires a lot more investment and marketing efforts

In line with the best traditions of the principle of the struggle for existence, security technologies evolve over time: new categories of products appear, others become extinct, while some products merge with others. Regarding the latter for example, integrity checkers were a major breakthrough in the mid-90s, but nowadays they’re a minor part of endpoint solutions. New market segments and niches appear (for example, Anti-APT) to complement the existing arsenals of protective technologies – this being a normal process of positive symbiosis for good. But all the while nasty parasites crawl out of the woodwork to warm themselves in the sun. C’est la vie – as it’s always been, and there’s nothing you can do about it.

In the struggle for market share in IT Security there regularly appear prophets prophesizing a sudden end to ‘traditional’ technologies and – by happy chance – simultaneous (‘just in time!’) invention of a bullshit product revolutionary panacea (with generous discounts for the first five customers).

ai_oil_2

But this isn’t something new: any of you remember anti-spyware? In the early 2000s a huge bubble of products to get rid of spyware grew up from nothing. Much BS was fired the consumer’s way about the inability of ‘traditional antivirus’ to cope with this particular problem, but right from the beginning it was all just made up.

But the market has grown used to and tired of such prophets, and these days monetizing ‘panaceas’ requires a lot more investment and snake oil marketing efforts.

Read on: David and Don Draper Against Goliath…

Darwinism in IT Security: Adapt or Die.

“It is not the strongest of the species that survives but the most adaptable to change.”
– Charles Darwin

It’s been a while since I’ve opined on these here cyber-pages on my favorite topic – the future of IT Security, so here’s making up for that. Get ready for a lot of words – hopefully none too extraneous – on the latest Infosec tech, market and tendencies, with a side dish of assorted facts and reflections. Popcorn at the ready – off we go…

I’ll be writing here about ideal IT Security and how the security industry is evolving towards it (and what’s happening along that evolutionary road towards it), and how all that can be explained with the help of Mr. Darwin’s theory of evolution. How natural selection leads certain species to dominate, while others fall by the wayside – left for the paleontologists in years to come. Oh, and what is symbiosis, and what are parasites.

ai_oil_1

I’ll start with some definitions…

Almost-Perfection in an Imperfect World.

Perfect protection – 100% security – is impossible. The IT Security industry can and should of course aim for perfection, in the process creating the best-protected systems possible, but each inching nearer 100% costs exponentially more – so much more that the cost of protection winds up being greater than the cost of potential damage from the harshest of scenarios of a successful attack.

Ideal protection is that where the cost of a successful attack is greater than the gain

Accordingly, it’s logical to give the following definition of realistic (attainable) ideal protection (from the viewpoint of potential victims): Ideal protection is that where the cost to hack our system is greater than the cost of the potential damage that could be caused. Or, looking at it from the other side of the barricades: Ideal protection is that where the cost of a successful attack is greater than the gain attackers would receive.

Of course, there’ll be times when how much an attack may cost doesn’t matter to the attackers; for example, to state-backed cyberwar-mongers. But that doesn’t mean we just give up.

So how do we develop a security system that provides realistic (attainable) ideal (maximum) protection?

Read on: The survival of IT’s fittest…

Get Your KICS en Route to Industrial Protection.

Hurray!

We’ve launched our KICS (Kaspersky Industrial CyberSecurity), the special cyber-inoculation against cyber-disease, which protect factories, power plants, hospitals, airports, hotels, warehouses, your favorite deli, and thousands of other types of enterprises that use industrial control systems (ICS). Or, put another way, since it’s rare for an enterprise today to manage without such systems, we’ve just launched a cyber-solution for millions of large, medium and small production and service businesses all around the world!

So what’s this KICS all about exactly? What’s it for? First, rewind…

Before the 2000s a cyberattack on an industrial installation was a mere source of inspiration for science fiction writers. But on August 14, 2003 in northeastern USA and southeastern Canada, the science fiction became a reality:

kaspersky-industrial-security-1Oops

Because of certain power grid glitches, 50 million North Americans went without electricity – some for several hours, others for several days. Many reasons were put forward as to the reasons behind this man-made catastrophe, including unkempt trees, a bolt of lightning, malicious squirrels, and… a side-effect from a cyberattack using the Slammer (Blaster) computer worm.

Read on: Hacked in 60 seconds…

The Big Picture.

Last spring (2015), we discovered Duqu 2.0 – a highly professional, very expensive, cyber-espionage operation. Probably state-sponsored. We identified it when we were testing the beta-version of the Kaspersky Anti Targeted Attack (KATA) platform – our solution that defends against sophisticated targeted attacks just like Duqu 2.0.

And now, a year later, I can proudly proclaim: hurray!! The product is now officially released and fully battle ready!

Kaspersky Anti-Targeted Attack Platform

But first, let me now go back in time a bit to tell you about why things have come to this – why we’re now stuck with state-backed cyber-spying and why we had to come up with some very specific protection against it.

(While for those who’d prefer to go straight to the beef in this here post – click here.)

‘The good old days’ – words so often uttered as if bad things just never happened in the past. The music was better, society was fairer, the streets were safer, the beer had a better head, and on and on and on. Sometimes, however, things really were better; one example being how relatively easy it was to fight cyber-pests in years past.

Of course, back then I didn’t think so. We were working 25 hours a day, eight days a week, all the time cursing the virus writers and their phenomenal reproduction rate. Each month (and sometimes more often) there were global worm epidemics and we were always thinking that things couldn’t get much worse. How wrong we were…

At the start of this century viruses were written mainly by students and cyber-hooligans. They’d neither the intention nor the ability to create anything really serious, so the epidemics they were responsible for were snuffed out within days – often using proactive methods. They simply didn’t have any motivation for coming up with anything more ominous; they were doing it just for kicks when they’d get bored of Doom and Duke Nukem :).

The mid-2000s saw big money hit the Internet, plus new technologies that connected everything from power plants to mp3 players. Professional cybercriminal groups also entered the stage seeking the big bucks the Internet could provide, while cyber-intelligence-services-cum-armies were attracted to it by the technological possibilities if offered. These groups had the motivation, means and know-how to create reeeaaaally complex malware and conduct reeeaaaally sophisticated attacks while remaining under the radar.

Around about this time… ‘antivirus died’: traditional methods of protection could no longer maintain sufficient levels of security. Then a cyber-arms race began – a modern take on the eternal model of power based on violence – either attacking using it or defending against its use. Cyberattacks became more selective/pinpointed in terms of targets chosen, more stealthy, and a lot more advanced.

In the meantime ‘basic’ AV (which by then was far from just AV) had evolved into complex, multi-component systems of multi-level protection, crammed full of all sorts of different protective technologies, while advanced corporate security systems had built up yet more formidable arsenals for controlling perimeters and detecting intrusions.

However, that approach, no matter how impressive on the face of it, had one small but critical drawback for large corporations: it did little to proactively detect the most professional targeted attacks – those that use unique malware using specific social engineering and zero-days. Malware that can stay unnoticed to security technologies.

I’m talking attacks carefully planned months if not years in advance by top experts backed by bottomless budgets and sometimes state financial support. Attacks like these can sometimes stay under the radar for many years; for example, the Equation operation we uncovered in 2014 had roots going back as far as 1996!

Banks, governments, critical infrastructure, manufacturing – tens of thousands of large organizations in various fields and with different forms of ownership (basically the basis of today’s world economy and order) – all of it turns out to be vulnerable to these super professional threats. And the demand for targets’ data, money and intellectual property is high and continually rising.

So what’s to be done? Just accept these modern day super threats as an inevitable part of modern life? Give up the fight against these targeted attacks?

No way.

Anything that can be attacked – no matter how sophisticatedly – can be protected to a great degree if you put serious time and effort and brains into that protection. There’ll never be 100% absolute protection, but there is such a thing as maximal protection, which makes attacks economically unfeasible to carry out: barriers so formidable that the aggressors decide to give up putting vast resources into getting through them, and instead go off and find some lesser protected victims. Of course there’ll be exceptions, especially when politically motivated attacks against certain victims are on the agenda; such attacks will be doggedly seen through to the end – a victorious end for the attacker; but that’s no reason to quit putting up a fight.

All righty. Historical context lesson over, now to that earlier mentioned sirloin…

…Just what the doctor ordered against advanced targeted attacks – our new Kaspersky Anti Targeted Attack platform (KATA).

So what exactly is this KATA, how does it work, and how much does it cost?

First, a bit on the anatomy of a targeted attack…

A targeted attack is always exclusive: tailor-made for a specific organization or individual.

The baddies behind a targeted attack start out by scrupulously gathering information on the targets right down to the most minor of details – for the success of an attack depends on the completeness of such a ‘dossier’ almost as much as the budget of the operation. All the targeted individuals are spied on and analyzed: their lifestyles, families, hobbies, and so on. How the corporate network is constructed is also studied carefully. And on the basis of all the information collected an attack strategy is selected.

Next, (i) the network is penetrated and remote (& undetected) access with maximum privileges is obtained. After that, (ii) the critical infrastructure nodes are compromised. And finally, (iii) ‘bombs away!’: the pilfering or destruction of data, the disruption of business processes, or whatever else might be the objective of the attack, plus the equally important covering one’s tracks so no one knows who’s responsible.

The motivation, the duration of the various prep-and-execution stages, the attack vectors, the penetration technologies, and the malware itself – all of it is very individual. But not matter how exclusive an attack gets, it will always have an Achilles’ heel. For an attack will always cause at least a few tiny noticeable happenings (network activity, certain behavior of files and other objects, etc.), anomalies being thrown up, and abnormal network activity. So seeing the bird’s-eye view big picture – in fact the whole picture formed from different sources around the network – makes it possible to detect a break-in.

To collect all the data about such anomalies and the creation of the big picture, KATA uses sensors – special ‘e-agents’ – which continuously analyze IP/web/email traffic plus events on workstations and servers.

For example, we intercept IP traffic (HTTP(s), FTP, DNS) using TAP/SPAN; the web sensor integrates with the proxy servers via ICAP; and the mail sensor is attached to the email servers via POP3(S). The agents are real lightweight (for Windows – around 15 megabytes), are compatible with other security software, and make hardly any impact at all on either network or endpoint resources.

All collected data (objects and metadata) are then transferred to the Analysis Center for processing using various methods (sandbox, AV scanning and adjustable YARA rules, checking file and URL reputations, vulnerability scanning, etc.) and archiving. It’s also possible to plug the system into our KSN cloud, or to keep things internal – with an internal copy of KpSN for better compliance.

Once the big picture is assembled, it’s time for the next stage! KATA reveals suspicious activity and can inform the admins and SIEM (Splunk, Qradar, ArcSight) about any unpleasantness detected. Even better – the longer the system works and the more data accumulates about the network, the more effective it is, since atypical behavior becomes easier to spot.

More details on how KATA works… here.

Ah yes; nearly forgot… how much does all this cost?

Well, there’s no simple answer to that one. The price of the service depends on dozens of factors, including the size and topology of the corporate network, how the solution is configured, and how many accompanying services are used. One thing is clear though: the cost pales into insignificance if compared with the potential damage it prevents.

The abracadabra of anonymous sources.

Who killed JFK?

Who’s controlling the Bermuda Triangle?

What’s the Freemasons’ objective?

Easy! For it turns out that answers to these questions couldn’t be more straightforward. All you have to do is add: ‘according to information from anonymous sources‘, and voila! — there’s your answer — to any question, about anything, or anyone. And the answers are all the more credible – not because of their… credibility – but because of the level of prestige commonly ascribed to the particular media outlet that broke the story.

Just recently, Reuters got a ‘world exclusive’ of jaw-dropping proportions in the antivirus world. The article, filled with sensational – false – allegations, claims Kaspersky Lab (KL), creates very specific, targeted malware, and distributes it anonymously to other anti-malware competitors, with the sole purpose of causing serious trouble for them and harming their market share. Oh yes. But they forgot to add that we conjure all this up during steamy banya sessions, after parking the bears we ride outside.

The Reuters story is based on information provided by anonymous former KL employees. And the accusations are complete nonsense, pure and simple.

Disgruntled ex-employees often say nasty things about their former employers, but in this case, the lies are just ludicrous. Maybe these sources managed to impress the journalist, but in my view publishing such an ‘exclusive’ – WITHOUT A SHRED OF EVIDENCE – is not what I understand to be good journalism. I’m just curious to see what these ‘ex-employees’ tell the media next time about us, and who might believe their BS.

The reality is that the Reuters story is a conflation of a number of facts with a generous amount of pure fiction.

In 2012-2013, the anti-malware industry suffered badly because of serious problems with false positives. And unfortunately, we were among the companies badly affected. It turned out to be a coordinated attack on the industry: someone was spreading legitimate software laced with malicious code targeting specifically the antivirus engines of many companies, including KL. It remains a mystery who staged the attack, but now I’m being told it was me! I sure didn’t see that one coming, and am totally surprised by this baseless accusation!

Here’s how it happened: in November 2012 our products produced false positives on several files that were in fact legitimate. These were the Steam client, Mail.ru game center, and QQ client. An internal investigation showed that these incidents occurred as the result of a coordinated attack by an unknown third party.

For several months prior to the incidents, through intra-industry information-exchange channels such as the VirusTotal website, our anti-malware research lab repeatedly received numerous slightly modified legitimate files of Steam, Mail.ru and QQ. The creator(s) of these files added pieces of malicious code to them.

Later we came to the conclusion that the attackers might have had prior knowledge of how different companies’ detection algorithms work and injected the malicious code precisely in a place where auto systems would search for it.

These newly received modified files were evaluated as malicious and stored in our databases. In total, we received several dozen legitimate files containing malicious code.

False positives started to appear once the legitimate owners of the files released updated versions of their software. The system compared the files to the malware database – which contained very similar files – and deemed the legitimate files malicious. After that, we upgraded our detection algorithms to avoid such detections.

Meanwhile the attacks continued through 2013 and we continued to receive modified legitimate files. We also became aware that our company was not the only one targeted by this attack: other industry players received these files as well and mistakenly detected them.

In 2013 there was a closed-door meeting among leading cybersecurity and other software industry players that also suffered from the attack – as well as vendors that were not affected by the problem but were aware of it. During that meeting the participants exchanged information about the incidents, tried to figure out the reasons behind them, and worked on an action plan. Unfortunately no breakthrough occurred, though some interesting theories regarding attribution were expressed. In particular, the participants of the meeting considered that some other AV vendor could be behind the attack, or that the attack was an attempt by an unknown but powerful malicious actor to adjust its malware in order to avoid detection by key AV products.

Accusations such as these are nothing new. As far back as the late nineties I’d take with me to press conferences a placard with the word ‘No!’ on it. It saved me so much time. I’d just point to it when every third question was: “Do you write viruses yourselves, for your product to then ‘cure’ the infections?” Oh yeah. Sure. And still today I get asked the same all the time. Do they really think an 18+ year-old business built 100% on trust would be doing such things?

It seems some folks just prefer to presume guilt until innocence is proven. I guess there’ll always be folks like that. C’est la vie. But I really do hope that people will see through these anonymous, silly and groundless accusations… What I can say for sure is that we’ll continue working very closely with the industry to make the digital world safer, and that our commitment and resolve to expose cyberthreats regardless of their source or origin won’t waiver.

.@kaspersky rubbishes claims they poisoned competitors with false positivesTweet
https://twitter.com/luludcheng/status/632241882437976064

Independent AV testing in 2014: interesting results!

At KL we’re always at it. Improving ourselves, that is. Our research, our development, our products, our partnerships, our… yes – all that. But for us all to keep improving – and in the right direction – we all need to work toward one overarching goal, or mission. Enter the mission statement…

Ours is saving the world from cyber-menaces of all types. But how well do we do this? After all, a lot, if not all AV vendors have similar mission statements. So what we and – more importantly – the user needs to know is precisely how well we perform in fulfilling our mission – compared to all the rest…

To do this, various metrics are used. And one of the most important is the expert testing of the quality of products and technologies by different independent testing labs. It’s simple really: the better the result on this or that – or all – criteria, the better our tech is at combatting cyber-disease – to objectively better save the world :).

Thing is, out of all the hundreds of tests by the many independent testing centers around the world, which should be used? I mean, how can all the data be sorted and refined to leave hard, meaningful – and easy to understand and compare – results? There’s also the problem of there being not only hundreds of testing labs but also hundreds of AV vendors so, again, how can it all be sieved – to remove the chaff from the wheat and to then compare just the best wheat? There’s one more problem (it’s actually not that complex, I promise – you’ll see:) – that of biased or selective test results, which don’t give the full picture – the stuff of advertising and marketing since year dot.

Well guess what. Some years back we devised the following simple formula for accessible, accurate, honest AV evaluation: the Top-3 Rating Matrix!.

So how’s it work?

First, we need to make sure we include the results of all well-known and respected, fully independent test labs in their comparative anti-malware protection investigations over the given period of time.

Second, we need to include all the different types of tests of the chosen key testers – and on all participating vendors.

Third, we need to take into account (i) the total number of tests in which each vendor took part; (ii) the % of ‘gold medals’; and (iii) the % of top-3 places.

What we get is simplicity, transparency, meaningful sifting, and no skewed ‘test marketing’ (alas, there is such a thing). Of course it would be possible to add into the matrix another, say, 25,000 parameters – just for that extra 0.025% of objectivity, but that would only be for the satisfaction of technological narcissists and other geek-nerds, and we’d definitely lose the average user… and maybe the not-so-average one too.

To summarize: we take a specific period, take into account all the tests of all the best test labs (on all the main vendors), and don’t miss a thing (like poor results in this or that test) – and that goes for KL of course too.

All righty. Theory over. Now let’s apply that methodology to the real world; specifically – the real world in 2014.

First, a few tech details and disclaimers for those of the geeky-nerdy persuasion:

  • Considered in 2014 were the comparative studies of eight independent testing labs (with: years of experience, the requisite technological set-up (I saw some for myself), outstanding industry coverage – both of the vendors and of the different protective technologies, and full membership of AMTSO) : AV-Comparatives, AV-Test, Anti-malware, Dennis Technology Labs, MRG EFFITAS, NSS Labs, PC Security Labs and Virus Bulletin. A detailed explanation of the methodology – in this video and in this document.
  • Only vendors taking part in 35% or more of the labs’ tests were taken into account. Otherwise it would be possible to get a ‘winner’ that did well in just a few tests, but which wouldn’t have done well consistently over many tests – if it had taken part in them (so here’s where we filter out the faux-test marketing).

Soooo… analyzing the results of the tests in 2014, we get……..

….Drums roll….

….mouths are cupped….

….breath is bated….

……..we get this!:

Independent testing 2014:  the results

Read on: Are all washing powder brands the same?…