Artificial intelligence… Two words which together conjure up so much wonder and awe in the imagination of programmers, sci-fi fans and perhaps just about anyone with an interest in the fate of the world!
Thanks to man’s best friend the dogR2-D2, the evil Skynet, the fantastical 2001: A Space Odyssey, post-apocalyptical androids dreaming of electric sheep, and maybe also Gary Numan, everyone is pretty well familiar with the concept of artificial intelligence (AI). Yep, books, the big screen, comics, er… mashed potato advertisements – AI is in all of them in a big way. It also features heavily in the marketing materials of recently-appearing and exceptionally-ambitious cybersecurity companies. In fact, there’s probably only one place today where you can’t find it. Thing is, that single place happens to cover practically everything that makes up this world and all the life in it: the not-so-insignificant sphere called ‘real everyday life‘.
It’s common knowledge that since the days of Alan Turing and Norbert Wiener (that is, around the mid-20th century) computers have come on in leaps and bounds. They learned how (rather, they were taught how) to play chess – and better than humans. They fly planes, now also cars on the roads. They write newspaper articles, catch malware and do tons of other useful – and often not so useful – things. They pass the Turing test to prove possession of intelligent behavior equivalent to a human. However, a chatterbot simulating a 13-year-old capable of nothing else – that is just an algorithm plus a collection of libraries. It is not artificial intelligence. Not convinced? Then I advise you simply look up the definition of AI, then that of an algorithm, and then look at the differences between the two. It’s not rocket computer science.
We are currently witnessing yet another wave of interest in AI across the world. Which number this wave is I’ve lost track of…
…Sort of, as, well, the specific problem of parasites in the IT Security world I’ll be writing about today has been at the back of my mind for a long time already. This Darwinism talk seemed the perfect opportunity to finally let rip. You’ll see what I mean…
Today folks: parasites. But not those we’re fighting against (the ‘very’ bad guys); those who claim are also fighting the very bad guys (philosophical question: who’s worse?).
Infosec parasites practicing detection adoption is killing the industry and indirectly assisting cybercrime
The IT industry today is developing at a galloping pace. Just 10-15 years ago its main themes were desktop antiviruses, firewalls and backups; today there’s a mass of new different security solutions, approaches and ideas. Sometimes we manage to stay ahead of the curve; sometimes we have some catch-up to do. And there are other times we fall into a stupor from astonishment – not from new technologies, innovations or fresh ideas, but from the barefaced brazenness and utter unscrupulousness of our colleagues in the security industry.
But first, let me explain how events have been developing.
There’s a very useful service called the VirusTotal multiscanner. It aggregates around 60 antivirus engines, which it uses to scan files and URLs folks send it for malware checking, and then it returns the verdict.
Example: Joe Bloggs finds a suspicious application or office document on a hard drive/USB stick/the Internet. Joe’s own antivirus software doesn’t flag it as containing a malware, but Joe is the paranoid type; he wants to make really sure it’s not infected. So he heads over to the VirusTotal site, which doesn’t have just one antivirus solution like he does, but ~60. It’s free too, so it’s a no brainer. So Joe uploads the file to VirusTotal and gets instant info on what all the different AVs think about it.
First of all, to clarify: both the folks at VirusTotal and those at VirusTotal’s owners Google are firmly on the ‘good guys’ side. They have no connection with parasites whatsoever. VirusTotal is run by a very professional team, which has for years been fulfilling the task at hand extremely effectively. (Still need convincing? How about VirusTotal winning the MVP award last year at the Security Analyst Summit (SAS)?) Today VirusTotal is one of the most important sources of new malware samples and malicious URLs; and also a very cool archeological tool for researching targeted attacks.
The problem lies with a handful of shady users of the multiscanner who, alas, are becoming more and more unblushingly unabashed in how they conduct themselves.
To date, what precisely brings about mutations of living organisms is unknown. Some of the more unconventional experts reckon it’s the work of viruses, which intentionally rearrange genes (yep, there’s who really rules the world!). But whatever the case may be, similar mutation processes also occur in IT Security – sometimes with the help of viruses too.
The market is tired of prophets; these days monetizing ‘panaceas’ requires a lot more investment and marketing efforts
In line with the best traditions of the principle of the struggle for existence, security technologies evolve over time: new categories of products appear, others become extinct, while some products merge with others. Regarding the latter for example, integrity checkers were a major breakthrough in the mid-90s, but nowadays they’re a minor part of endpoint solutions. New market segments and niches appear (for example, Anti-APT) to complement the existing arsenals of protective technologies – this being a normal process of positive symbiosis for good. But all the while nasty parasites crawl out of the woodwork to warm themselves in the sun. C’est la vie – as it’s always been, and there’s nothing you can do about it.
In the struggle for market share in IT Security there regularly appear prophets prophesizing a sudden end to ‘traditional’ technologies and – by happy chance – simultaneous (‘just in time!’) invention of a bullshit product revolutionary panacea (with generous discounts for the first five customers).
But this isn’t something new: any of you remember anti-spyware? In the early 2000s a huge bubble of products to get rid of spyware grew up from nothing. Much BS was fired the consumer’s way about the inability of ‘traditional antivirus’ to cope with this particular problem, but right from the beginning it was all just made up.
But the market has grown used to and tired of such prophets, and these days monetizing ‘panaceas’ requires a lot more investment and snake oil marketing efforts.
“It is not the strongest of the species that survives but the most adaptable to change.”
– Charles Darwin
It’s been a while since I’ve opined on these here cyber-pages on my favorite topic – the future of IT Security, so here’s making up for that. Get ready for a lot of words – hopefully none too extraneous – on the latest Infosec tech, market and tendencies, with a side dish of assorted facts and reflections. Popcorn at the ready – off we go…
I’ll be writing here about ideal IT Security and how the security industry is evolving towards it (and what’s happening along that evolutionary road towards it), and how all that can be explained with the help of Mr. Darwin’s theory of evolution. How natural selection leads certain species to dominate, while others fall by the wayside – left for the paleontologists in years to come. Oh, and what is symbiosis, and what are parasites.
I’ll start with some definitions…
Almost-Perfection in an Imperfect World.
Perfectprotection – 100% security – is impossible. The IT Security industry can and should of course aim for perfection, in the process creating the best-protected systems possible, but each inching nearer 100% costs exponentially more – so much more that the cost of protection winds up being greater than the cost of potential damage from the harshest of scenarios of a successful attack.
Ideal protection is that where the cost of a successful attack is greater than the gain
Accordingly, it’s logical to give the following definition of realistic (attainable)idealprotection (from the viewpoint of potential victims): Ideal protection is that where the cost to hack our system is greater than the cost of the potential damage that could be caused. Or, looking at it from the other side of the barricades: Ideal protection is that where the cost of a successful attack is greater than the gain attackers would receive.
Of course, there’ll be times when how much an attack may cost doesn’t matter to the attackers; for example, to state-backed cyberwar-mongers. But that doesn’t mean we just give up.
So how do we develop a security system that provides realistic (attainable)ideal(maximum)protection?
Quicker, more reliable, more techy, and of course the most modest…
… Yep, you guessed it, that’ll be us folks – YET AGAIN!
We’ve just been awarded Product of the Year once more by independent Austrian test lab AV-Comparatives. Scoring top @ AV-C is becoming a yearly January tradition: 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, and now 2015! Hurray!
Now for a bit about how they determine the winner…
Easy! For it turns out that answers to these questions couldn’t be more straightforward. All you have to do is add: ‘according to information from anonymous sources‘, and voila! — there’s your answer — to any question, about anything, or anyone. And the answers are all the more credible – not because of their… credibility – but because of the level of prestige commonly ascribed to the particular media outlet that broke the story.
note to self: when I publish my next APT report, I'll make sure to quote at least two anonymous sources, for added credibility.
Just recently, Reuters got a ‘world exclusive’ of jaw-dropping proportions in the antivirus world. The article, filled with sensational – false – allegations, claims Kaspersky Lab (KL), creates very specific, targeted malware, and distributes it anonymously to other anti-malware competitors, with the sole purpose of causing serious trouble for them and harming their market share. Oh yes. But they forgot to add that we conjure all this up during steamy banya sessions, after parking the bears we ride outside.
I don’t usually read @reuters. But when I do, I see false positives. For the record: this story is a complete BS: https://t.co/m0Rcy2Vm6Y
The Reuters story is based on information provided by anonymous former KL employees. And the accusations are complete nonsense, pure and simple.
Disgruntled ex-employees often say nasty things about their former employers, but in this case, the lies are just ludicrous. Maybe these sources managed to impress the journalist, but in my view publishing such an ‘exclusive’ – WITHOUT A SHRED OF EVIDENCE – is not what I understand to be good journalism. I’m just curious to see what these ‘ex-employees’ tell the media next time about us, and who might believe their BS.
The reality is that the Reuters story is a conflation of a number of facts with a generous amount of pure fiction.
To be honest: its quite annoying all these insinuating stories about Kaspersky. Haven't seen any solid evidence nor trustworthy sources.
In 2012-2013, the anti-malware industry suffered badly because of serious problems with false positives. And unfortunately, we were among the companies badly affected. It turned out to be a coordinated attack on the industry: someone was spreading legitimate software laced with malicious code targeting specifically the antivirus engines of many companies, including KL. It remains a mystery who staged the attack, but now I’m being told it was me! I sure didn’t see that one coming, and am totally surprised by this baseless accusation!
Here’s how it happened: in November 2012 our products produced false positives on several files that were in fact legitimate. These were the Steam client, Mail.ru game center, and QQ client. An internal investigation showed that these incidents occurred as the result of a coordinated attack by an unknown third party.
For several months prior to the incidents, through intra-industry information-exchange channels such as the VirusTotal website, our anti-malware research lab repeatedly received numerous slightly modified legitimate files of Steam, Mail.ru and QQ. The creator(s) of these files added pieces of malicious code to them.
Later we came to the conclusion that the attackers might have had prior knowledge of how different companies’ detection algorithms work and injected the malicious code precisely in a place where auto systems would search for it.
These newly received modified files were evaluated as malicious and stored in our databases. In total, we received several dozen legitimate files containing malicious code.
False positives started to appear once the legitimate owners of the files released updated versions of their software. The system compared the files to the malware database – which contained very similar files – and deemed the legitimate files malicious. After that, we upgraded our detection algorithms to avoid such detections.
Meanwhile the attacks continued through 2013 and we continued to receive modified legitimate files. We also became aware that our company was not the only one targeted by this attack: other industry players received these files as well and mistakenly detected them.
In 2013 there was a closed-door meeting among leading cybersecurity and other software industry players that also suffered from the attack – as well as vendors that were not affected by the problem but were aware of it. During that meeting the participants exchanged information about the incidents, tried to figure out the reasons behind them, and worked on an action plan. Unfortunately no breakthrough occurred, though some interesting theories regarding attribution were expressed. In particular, the participants of the meeting considered that some other AV vendor could be behind the attack, or that the attack was an attempt by an unknown but powerful malicious actor to adjust its malware in order to avoid detection by key AV products.
We had investigated these attacks but could not find out who was behind them. We had some suspects, Kaspersky was not one of them.
Accusations such as these are nothing new. As far back as the late nineties I’d take with me to press conferences a placard with the word ‘No!’ on it. It saved me so much time. I’d just point to it when every third question was: “Do you write viruses yourselves, for your product to then ‘cure’ the infections?” Oh yeah. Sure. And still today I get asked the same all the time. Do they really think an 18+ year-old business built 100% on trust would be doing such things?
I really like @josephmenn but I am having a hard time with this @e_kaspersky story. I simply can't see them doing that.
It seems some folks just prefer to presume guilt until innocence is proven. I guess there’ll always be folks like that. C’est la vie. But I really do hope that people will see through these anonymous, silly and groundless accusations… What I can say for sure is that we’ll continue working very closely with the industry to make the digital world safer, and that our commitment and resolve to expose cyberthreats regardless of their source or origin won’t waiver.
.@kaspersky rubbishes claims they poisoned competitors with false positivesTweet
Around the turn of the century we released the LEAST successful version of our antivirus products – EVER! I don’t mind admitting it: it was a mega-fail – overall. Curiously, the version also happened to be mega-powerful too when it came to protection against malware, and had settings galore and all sorts of other bells and whistles. The one thing that let it down though was that it was large and slow and cumbersome, particularly when compared with our previous versions.
I could play the subjunctiveness game here and start asking obvious questions like ‘who was to blame?’, ‘what should have been done differently?’, etc., but I’m not going to do that (I’ll just mention in passing that we made some very serious HR decisions back then). I could play ‘what if’: who knows how different we as a company would be now if it wasn’t for that foul-up? Best though I think is to simply state how we realized we’d made a mistake, went back to the drawing board, and made sure our next version was way ahead of the competiton on EVERYTHING. Indeed, it was the engine that pushed us into domination in global antivirus retail sales, where our share continues to grow.
That’s right, our post-fail new products were ahead of everybody else’s by miles, including on performance, aka efficiency, aka how much system resources get used up during a scan. But still that… stench of sluggishness pursued us for years. Well, frankly, the smelliness is still giving us some trouble today. Memories are long, and they often don’t listen to new facts :). Also, back then our competitors put a lot of effort into trolling us – and still try to do so. Perhaps that’s because there’s nothing else – real nor current – to troll us for :).
Now though, here… time for some well-overdue spring cleaning. It’s time to clear up all the nonsense that’s accumulated over the years re our products’s efficiency once and for all…
Righty. Here are the results of recent antivirus product performance tests. Nothing but facts from a few respected testing labs – and it’s great food for thought. Have a look at the other vendors’ results, compare, and draw your own conclusions:
1. AV–Test.org
I’ve said many times that if you want to get the truly objective picture, you need to look at the broadest possible range of tests from the longest possible historical perspective. There are notorious cases of certain vendors submitting ‘cranked up’ versions optimized for specific tests to test labs instead of the regular ‘working’ versions you get in the shops
The guys from the Magdeburg lab have done one heck of a job in analyzing the results achieved by 23 antivirus products during the past year (01/2014 – 01/2015) to determine how much each product slowed the computer down.
There are many ways to make up something sensationalist in the media. One of the practical ways is to speculate and create conspiracy theories. Unfortunately, there’s a demand for such stories and they have a very good chance of making a splash.
So how can a global company with Russian roots play a part in a conspiracy theory? Well, this one is easy: there should be some devilish inner job of the Russian secret services (to produce the “I knew it!” effect). In many cases you can change the adjective “Russian” for any other to produce a similar effect. It’s a simple yet effective hands-on recipe for a sensationalist article. Exploiting paranoia is always a great tool for increasing readership.
There are questions we’ve answered a million times: what are our links with the KGB? Why do you expose cyber-campaigns by Western intelligence services? When do you plan to hire Edward Snowden? And other ones of the ‘have you stopped beating your wife?’ kind.
We’re a transparent company, so we’ve got detailed answers ready. Of course we want to dispel any speculation about our participation in any conspiracy. We’ve nothing to hide: we’re in the security business and to be successful in it you have to be open to scrutiny.
To my great regret, there are occasions when journalists publish something sensationalist without taking account obvious and/or easily obtainable facts contrary to their sensationalist claims, and produce stories that are at odds with professional ethics. And sometimes a bad tabloid journalism style finds its way into otherwise quality media publications. I’d like to comment on one such case.
The fashionable fever of looking for Kremlin-linked conspiracies this week reached some journalists at Bloomberg. Curiously, this happened not long after our investigation into the Equation Group.
FF to 1:55. Is this a warning we should stop researching any #APT that could be attributed to NSA? http://t.co/ICeNdd040J
It’s been a long time since I read an article so inaccurate from the get-go – literally from the title and the article’s subheading. So it came as little surprise that a large part of the rest of the article is simply false. Speculations, assumptions and unfair conclusions based on incorrect facts. In their pursuit for a sensation, the journalists turned things upside down and ignored some blatantly obvious facts.
My congratulations to the authors: they’ve scored high in bad journalism.
But that’s where the emotion stops today. Now let’s just look at the cold facts – rather, lack of them. Let me go through some of the most outrageous and twisted gaffes.
I must have said this a million times, but we do not care who’s behind the cyber-campaigns we expose. There is cyber-evil and we fight it. If a customer comes and shows us a problem we investigate it. And once we take the genie out of the bottle, there’s no way we can put it back.
But since these journalists tried to attribute the cyberattacks we exposed to the countries mentioned, for some reason they forgot about our reports on Red October, CloudAtlas, Miniduke, CosmicDuke, Epic Turla, Penguin Turla, Black Energy 1 and 2, Agent.BTZ, and Teamspy. According to some observers, these attacks were attributed to Russian cyber-spies.
The only other statement that can compete with this one in terms of frequency, silliness and falsity is: ‘AV companies write the virus themselves’.
Let me spell it out and use a few capitals: I’ve NEVER worked for the KGB.
My detailed biography has been widely distributed around the world and can be easily found online. It clearly states (I wonder if the journalists read it) that I studied mathematics at a school sponsored by they Ministry of Atomic Energy, the Ministry of Defense, the Soviet Space Agency and the KGB. After graduating, I worked for the Ministry of Defense as a software engineer for several years. But whatever… as they say, ‘never let the facts get in the way of a good story’. Right?
UPDATE:
Looks like the Bloomberg journos behind the story read my post (but not in detail; otherwise they’d have taken the article down) and made a minor edit to their text. Now, I never worked for KGB but for … Russian military intelligence!
For the record: I never worked for Russian military intelligence. As I mentioned above, I worked as a software engineer at the Ministry of Defense.
Is there an implication here that the ‘quickly removed by headquarters’ was to cover up some secret truth – before it got out? Maybe not. But if you do see a possible one, let me tell you what happened:
the design of the our antivirus software box with the KGB mention was developed by our Japanese partners. I learned about it only after it was printed, and asked to have it changed as it just wasn’t true, which was done.
And if there’s a further implication that the mention was removed because we were going global and recruiting ‘senior managers in the U.S. and Europe’ (with whom KGB mentions might not sit well), well then that’s not right either. We were already global. Our American, European and Asian employees (who now make up more than a third of total company’s headcount) had no say in it. Even if they did – so what? Bottom line – I never served in the KGB!
Just nonsense!
First, people join and leave organizations all the time. Second, we value only professional qualities in our people. Third, there’s no evidence of ‘closer’ – not even close – ties to Russia’s military or intelligence services. Must say though, I’d be really interested to find out who’s joined our top management team since 2012 who has ‘closer ties to Russia’s military or intelligence services’. I’m dying of curiosity!
I do appreciate this interest in my recreational-prophylactic habits. While the reader may visualize naked male bodies in a steam room and dicussions of conspirational plans to conquer the world, the truth of the matter is quite something else. It highlights another way in which the journalists ignored our emailed comments to them to sacrifice objectivity for quirky details and stereotypes.
First, sometimes I do go to the banya (sauna) with my colleagues. It’s not impossible that there might be Russian intelligence officials visiting the same building simultaneously with me, but I don’t know them.
Second, we do fight cybercrime. And without cooperating with law enforcement agencies around the globe (including in the U.S., the UK, Japan, other European countries; INTERPOL and Europol) our battle would have been significantly less effective than it has been recreational – if not completely futile.
Official meetings sometimes do turn pretty informal, including with officers belonging to the security services of the U.S., the UK, Japan, other European countries; INTERPOL and Europol (oops, I’m repeating myself). And I consider the stories about my possible encounters with security officials in a banya an attempt to deliberately mislead readers; the journalists don’t mention that we are impartial in our fight against cybercrime, no matter where it strikes. A warning, dear readers: don’t believe everything you read!
‘Gotcha, we’ve caught you! You investigate only US operations and not Russian!’
Well, this one’s real simple. FireEye did some great research, so publishing our own after theirs made no sense. We carefully read the FireEye report, warned our users and… kept on researching the Sofacy operation. BTW, our experts are still working on it, as it’s closely connected to the MiniDuke operation. But please don’t ask why FireEye didn’t announce MiniDuke! You know the answer (hint: who was the first to uncover it?).
We’ve launched an internal investigation, carefully examined all our archives for the last three years, and haven’t found such an email. Those who know Garry personally know he’s not the kind of man to write such things.
Does two-year compulsory military service of 18-year old private Chekunov equal working for the KGB? Really? Dear authors, why did you miss the detail where, in the USSR, military service was obligatory for all males, and it was random which particular service you served in? Some entered the infantry, others the submarine division of the navy. Mr. Chekunov served in the Soviet Union’s Border Service for two years, and at that time the service reported to the KGB.
Oh those Russians banya nights. The nerve center of all secret operations’ planning!
Actually, here, thanks are due to the authors for the PR! Our Computer Incidents Investigation Unit (CIIU) helps our clients deal with sophisticated cyber-incidents. If law enforcement agencies contact us, we help – regardless of their country. We assist with our world-class expertise any law enforcement agency to save the world from any cyber-evil.
The Computer Incidents Investigation Unit (CIIU) has remote access to the personal data of our users? That is a false statement.
Next: the keyword here is ‘can’. Theoretically, any security vendor can do that. Following this logic you can imagine what nasty things Facebook, Google or Microsoft can theoretically do. Theoretically, authors of an article can stick to facts.
The reality, however, is that I’ve no reason to risk my 700mln$ business. Everything we do and can do is stated in the End-User License Agreement (EULA). Moreover, we reveal our source code to large customers and governments. If you have any fears about backdoors – come and check. Seriously. Referring to a theory is an allegation unworthy of a respectable publication.
This part explains a lot. Some folks who get fired have a chip on their shoulder. Human nature. It’s common. They have some media contacts – they fancy getting their ‘revenge’. Same old!
I am just worried about how respected media put their reputation on the line based on speculation. As a result we have a perfect example of a sensationalist headline:
Bloomberg's Management Committee includes US citizens only. Does it mean Bloomberg has close ties to US spies? http://t.co/3AAuMPg90e
The result of the investigative journalism revealed these REAL facts:
I go to banya;
We hire and fire employees; employees leave of their own accord;
60% of our employees are Russians;
Our Chief Legal Officer served in the Border Control when he was 18 and at that time the service was a part of the KGB.
Mysterious covert data which proves I’m a KGB spy?! This world-famous news agency undertook a huge investigation – believe me, it was impressive! During the fact checking they asked very detailed, probing questions, yet all they came up with were… unproved allegations. Do you know why?
Because there’s nothing there to find.
It’s very hard for a company with Russian roots to become successful in the U.S., European and other markets. Nobody trusts us – by default. Our only strategy is to be 1000% transparent and honest. It took years to explain who we are. Many people attempted to find ‘dirt’ on us – and failed. Because we’ve nothing to hide.
Actually, I’d like to thank Bloomberg and all the journalists behind this story! Much like our antivirus often does, they performed a full system scan –and found nothing. It’s like a halal or kosher stamp – check! External audit successfully passed.
‘The hardest thing of all is to find a black cat in a dark room, especially if there’s no cat.”
.@e_kaspersky responds to Bloomberg’s allegations in connection with Russian LETweet
So, tell me, what do you think of this whole story:
At KL we’re always at it. Improving ourselves, that is. Our research, our development, our products, our partnerships, our… yes – all that. But for us all to keep improving – and in the right direction – we all need to work toward one overarching goal, or mission. Enter the mission statement…
Ours is saving the world from cyber-menaces of all types. But how well do we do this? After all, a lot, if not all AV vendors have similar mission statements. So what we and – more importantly – the user needs to know is precisely how well we perform in fulfilling our mission – compared to all the rest…
To do this, various metrics are used. And one of the most important is the expert testing of the quality of products and technologies by different independent testing labs. It’s simple really: the better the result on this or that – or all – criteria, the better our tech is at combatting cyber-disease – to objectively better save the world :).
Thing is, out of all the hundreds of tests by the many independent testing centers around the world, which should be used? I mean, how can all the data be sorted and refined to leave hard, meaningful – and easy to understand and compare – results? There’s also the problem of there being not only hundreds of testing labs but also hundreds of AV vendors so, again, how can it all be sieved – to remove the chaff from the wheat and to then compare just the best wheat? There’s one more problem (it’s actually not that complex, I promise – you’ll see:) – that of biased or selective test results, which don’t give the full picture – the stuff of advertising and marketing since year dot.
Well guess what. Some years back we devised the following simple formula for accessible, accurate, honest AV evaluation: the Top-3 Rating Matrix!.
So how’s it work?
First, we need to make sure we include the results of all well-known and respected, fully independent test labs in their comparative anti-malware protection investigations over the given period of time.
Second, we need to include all the different types of tests of the chosen key testers – and on all participating vendors.
Third, we need to take into account (i) the total number of tests in which each vendor took part; (ii) the % of ‘gold medals’; and (iii) the % of top-3 places.
What we get is simplicity, transparency, meaningful sifting, and no skewed ‘test marketing’ (alas, there is such a thing). Of course it would be possible to add into the matrix another, say, 25,000 parameters – just for that extra 0.025% of objectivity, but that would only be for the satisfaction of technological narcissists and other geek-nerds, and we’d definitely lose the average user… and maybe the not-so-average one too.
To summarize: we take a specific period, take into account all the tests of all the best test labs (on all the main vendors), and don’t miss a thing (like poor results in this or that test) – and that goes for KL of course too.
All righty. Theory over. Now let’s apply that methodology to the real world; specifically – the real world in 2014.
First, a few tech details and disclaimers for those of the geeky-nerdy persuasion:
Only vendors taking part in 35% or more of the labs’ tests were taken into account. Otherwise it would be possible to get a ‘winner’ that did well in just a few tests, but which wouldn’t have done well consistently over many tests – if it had taken part in them (so here’s where we filter out the faux-test marketing).
Soooo… analyzing the results of the tests in 2014, we get……..
Every system is based on a unique algorithm; without the algorithm there’s no system. It doesn’t really matter what kind of algorithm the system follows – linear, hierarchical, determined, stochastic or whatever. What’s important is that to reach the best result the system needs to follow certain rules.
We’re often asked about our products‘ algorithms – especially how they help us detect future threats better than the competition.
Well, for obvious reasons I can’t divulge the details of our magic formulae; however, what I will be doing in this tech-post (perhaps the techiest post on this blog ever) is open ajar the door to our technological kitchen – to give you a glimpse of what goes on inside. And if you still want more info, please fire away with your questions in the comments, below.
